The Unexpected Irony in Seattle's Offensive and Defensive Lines.

The Irony

In 2005, Seattle man-handled defenses at the point of attack.  Walter Jones, Steve Hutchinson, Chris Gray, Robbie Toebeck, and Sean locklear were a man-on run blocking force of nature.  Big, powerful, prototypical offensive linemen.  Teams knew where we were running and when we were running, and could do nothing about it.

At the same time, Seattle implemented a defensive front 4 that were smallish in nature. Fisher, Bernard, Darby, and Wistrom were in the mold of the quick, gap penetrating D-lineman, focused on creating pressure in the backfield.  Somewhat weak against the run at the point of attack, they made up for it with explosion off the ball and disrupted lanes.

The irony that I am seeing as the draft is approaching is that there seems to be a fundamental "flip-flop" in philosophy.  Our defensive line is getting beefier, while our offensive line should be looking to get leaner and more athletic (zone blocking concept).  I see this as a terrific move for the following reasons:

Offensively

From an economic standpoint, smaller, more athletic linemen are historically cheaper, and drafted more easily in the middle rounds.  Teams pay for large immovable men. Fortunately for teams implementing zone blocking, that isn't the skill set most required of the scheme.  

A switch to zone blocking also allows for a quicker learning curve. Zone blocking "rules" don't change depending on what the lineman sees in front of him.   In a "man blocking" system, lineman are assigned defenders according to the desired running lanes. Defensive front changes, stunts and blitzes, create a need for an O-lineman to read the change, and adapt his responsibility. Zone blocking uses rules that do not change according to the adjustments on the defensive line. Since there isn't as much emphasis on reading defensive changes and stunts many of the mistakes caused by lineman misreads are eliminated.

As the Denver Broncos and KC Chiefs have proven, a team that successfully implements a zone blocking scheme becomes far less dependent on RB investment.  A running back that may not possess the combine impressive numbers, yet possesses great field vision can succeed in a ZB system. This dramatically reduces a teams need to pony up big numbers for blue-chip RB's.

Defensively

The move toward larger defensive linemen solves two main problems.  Firstly, the Seahawks become stronger at the line of scrimmage (a weakness over the past few seasons), and second, it keeps more offensive linemen from getting to the second level (where our LB's don't possess great shed and tackle ability).

As it pertains to the Draft

I can't help but feel that our new philosophies may cause some head scratchers come draft time.  It has been widely accepted that OL depth (for example)  is a need, but names like Monroe, Smith, Oher, and Britton may not even be in play.  Fans may be left with that slack jawed "huh" feeling if names like Lydon Murtha or Andrew Gardner are called, but if this is the way it plays out, I fully support it.  Both of these linemen are sub 5 second 40 O-lineman with mobility that I feel have much better value in a ZB system than their second day draft rankings suggest.

Although somewhat surprising (coming from 2005 units that drastically differ in concept) I love the new philosophies TR and Jr. are implementing. It allows us to allocate Seahawk investment into areas that historically win championships (QB, CB, DL), and away from areas that historically are able to be filled later in the draft (OL RB WR)