If Seattle selects Brian Orakpo at four, he will be the first defensive end taken in the 2008 draft. I'm dreading that possibility. It's significant that Orakpo is the first defensive end taken, because it gives us a rough idea of his development. Talent is lot more fluid than it looks on a draft board, but teams have enjoyed a reasonable amount of success evaluating the best player at an individual position. The first two defensive ends drafted average five sacks per season, a sack a season more than the defensive ends drafted third and fourth. That means Orakpo could be expected to be about one sack per season better than Lawrence Jackson, who was the third defensive end selected in 2008 draft. What I want to know is how much does Jackson's and Darryl Tapp's advantage in experience put them ahead of Orakpo, and when will Orakpo's potential overtake their experience? In other words, if Seattle is drafting Orakpo thinking it should try to "win now", is it in fact putting itself behind?

Data is from the 1982 season to the 2004 season. 1982 is the year the NFL officially started tracking sacks. The data encompasses 138 players over 23 seasons.

The answer is no. The first two defensive ends selected in a draft outperform the second two defensive ends selected in a draft throughout their respective careers. The former outperform the latter in their rookie season, and that rookie season outperforms the latter in each of the four following seasons. The data titled "Fool's Gold" is the set of player's selected with the seventh or eight pick that outperformed their group's average each of their first two seasons. Darryl Tapp belongs to this group. That's only eight players, but it's at least interesting to ponder if Tapp's best seasons are already behind him. The data titled "Late Bloomers" is 28 players that underperformed their group's average in their first season. Jackson belongs to this group. Though, on the whole, they continue to underperform the larger group, they do eventually show improvement. After five seasons, the Fool's Gold group and Late Bloomers group settle in at three sacks a season.

Sacks are just a proxy for a defensive end's total contributions, his disruptiveness. Seattle has invested a late first round pick and a late second round pick on Jackson and Tapp. The two project, working strictly from this data, as below average defensive ends. It might seem premature, but if Seattle selects a defensive end with the fourth overall pick, there's reason and data to support it. It's Seattle's best chance to select a cornerstone player on a defense with aspirations of greatness.

In fairness to Colin Cole, I wanted to break down Cory Redding's play against the same opponent. You might be shocked to learn that copies of week one's epic showdown between the Atlanta Falcons and Detroit Lions are rather hard to find. And so, for the sake of timeliness, I will instead break down Detroit's home game against the Bears in week 6. Let's be clear about a few things. Atlanta ranked 13^th in rushing DVOA and 9^th in yards per attempt. Chicago ranked 24^th in rushing DVOA and 27^th in yards per attempt. Chicago rushed for 97 against Detroit. Atlanta rushed for 318. Still, I'm not so sure that's because Atlanta's interior linemen, Justin Blaylock, Todd McClure and Harvey Dahl, are better than Chicago's interior linemen, Josh Beekman, Olin Kreutz and Roberto Garza. When evaluating a defensive tackle, that's the opposing talent that matters. Both teams broke off something and left, winning by a combined 40 points.

Continue reading this post »

Darryl Tapp

Overview: Rookie Lawrence Jackson started ahead of Tapp until week 7. Tapp didn't win the job; Jackson lost it. On a depleted defensive end rotation, Tapp made up for missed time, recording 5.5 sacks in those eleven starts and ending the season as Seattle's most active end, playing nearly two-thirds of all defensive snaps.

What Went Wrong: Jackson starting ahead of Tapp. Jackson didn't so much earn the spot as be appointed. A pass rush is hugely dependent on the front four. Seattle rushes just four on about two-third of all plays, and even when a blitzer or three is added, the thrust of the rush comes from the defensive line. Swapping Jackson for Tapp weakened the entire pass rush, from allowing easy double teams on Kerney, to allowing guards and centers to peel off and pick up free blitzers or apply a double team.

What Went Right: Tapp is solid exactly as he is. He's consistently disruptive, able to beat about any type of tackle, and not so bad in run support as to be a liability. Tapp has a great first step, good dip, good inside move, good rip and a capable bull rush, plus the kind of suddenness to convert penetration into a sack. He makes those around him better.

Quintessential Game: Seahawks at 49ers

Seattle 34 - San Francisco 13

3-2-SF 39 (5:38)

Niners, 4 WR (2 Left/2 Right0, Rb. Seattle in a 4-1 Dime. At the snap, Tapp explodes on a nice short angled edge rush that pulls Adam Snyder wide. This is important because an offensive line is strongest when its compact, as it bows and players are isolated pass rushing gaps appear. Tapp's edge rush and Brandon Mebane's forced double team isolates Tony Wragge and Bernard is able to exploit the gaping "C" gap on Wragge's right. From there it's just a good skill and talent showing by Bernard as he closes on Hill and swats the ball from his hand. It's two games, but it's good to see Tapp back.

Outlook: Tapp turns 25 next September. 2009 is his walk season. Seattle would be best served to lock him up now, but won't. Instead, expect Tapp to be franchised and paid a little too much next season. Tapp is entering his prime seasons, but he won't enjoy a huge mid-career breakout. Instead, he should start hovering around double digit sacks for the next three seasons or so. In between those sacks he'll be the guy forcing off balance throws and check downs, bowing the pocket and being an unassuming difference maker.

Leonard Weaver was not invited to the 2005 NFL Combine. He signed with Seattle as an undrafted free agent. A combination of luck, hard work and fit earned him a spot on Seattle's roster. Four years later, he once again finds himself unwanted by the NFL.

He doesn't fit what new offensive coordinator Greg Knapp wants in a fullback. We can talk about adjusting scheme to talent, but that has limitations. Weaver is a converted tight end and he lead blocks like one. The method of Knapp's offense is to run the ball on 50%+ of all downs, and on nearly two thirds of those runs to run from a two back set. If we use a 1,000 play baseline, and assume that the second back in most two back sets is a fullback, then Seattle's fullback will play in about 300 snaps as a lead blocker. In 2007, Oakland ran the ball in 508 of 1000 total offensive attempts. Fullback Justin Griffith played in all 16 games. That season, Oakland ran from two backs sets on 63% of all runs (PFP 2008). Griffith had just seven rushing attempts. Weaver had 30 in 2008 and 33 in 2007.

Knapp needs a fullback that blocks first, runs and receives a distant second. That's not Leonard Weaver. Then, why not make Weaver something other than a fullback?

Seattle has its fullback in Owen Schmitt. Schmitt played in a spread option in college, so his traditional fullback skills are a little underdeveloped. The kid knows how to move and block and deliver a blow on the move. At some point, Seattle needs to throw him into the fire and see if he survives. Seattle needs a fallback fullback should Schmitt not take to the finer elements of the position - specifically pass blocking. There may not be a better pass blocking back than Weaver.

Weaver is also a valuable rusher and an exceptional receiver. He has contributed more receiving DYAR the past two seasons than Nate Burleson, DJ Hackett or Deion Branch. It might seem unfair to compare the sick to the well until you realize that Burleson, Hackett and Branch are wide receivers. Weaver has soft hands, good body control, a rare ability to cut up field after the catch and a fullback's mentality to yards after contact. He brings that mentality to his bruising inside running style. He has averaged 4.5 yards per rush, and despite being the saddle on Mike Holmgren's hobbyhorse fullback draw, has contributed 39 DYAR rushing the past two seasons.

Seattle will have plenty of touches to go around. Knapp will want to run five to six hundred times in 2009. That could split 250 for Julius Jones, 150 for TJ Duckett and still leave 100 to split between Weaver and Schmitt. Say, 85-15. That's a conservative estimate. It still nearly triples Duckett's touches,  and would be the second most of his career.  Jones' career high is 267 in 2006; he had 257 in 2005. Seattle goes on a roll, racks up a winning record, smothering opponents with the third quarter long drive, and their rush attempts could jump to 550 or even 600. That could be split however, probably towards more touches for Jones, the nominal starting running back, but however, it's an equitable split that keeps everyone involved and everyone fresh. Schmitt becomes the fullback. Weaver just another running back.

The problem is Seattle and the league sees Weaver as a fullback and barely that. Fullbacks do not rush 100 times a year. They block. They get their cleats muddy and their facemasks bent. They struggle for short yardage and push the pile. Fullbacks embody three yards and a cloud of dust. Yeah, except...

Looks a little like...

Minus the grit and savvy.

Tim Ruskell should know talent comes in many bodies. In comes in too short defensive tackles that manhandle prototypical guards. It comes in too slow tight ends that run routes sculpted by Donatello. And it comes in miscast fullbacks that do everything well but lead block. Letting Leonard Weaver walk is losing talent for the sake of rigidness. It's losing talent for the sake of narrow roles, football dogma and a damning reverence for the title "fullback".

Re-Sign Leonard Weaver.

The Oregon Ducks ranked 82^nd in total defense and 111^th in passing defense, allowing 389.6 and 270.2 yards per game, respectively. That is inflated by pace. Oregon ranked 40^th in adjusted defensive FEI and 39^th in unadjusted defensive FEI. Oregon was scoring in bunches -- and fast. Meaning opponents had plenty of drives to amass yards.

The Ducks were not a good defense in the first quarter of the Holliday Bowl. The pass rush was null and the secondary looked disorganized and unaware. That puts a burden on Patrick Chung and makes scouting him rather tough. Chung is Oregon's factotum. He plays nickel, plays center field, plays in the box, contains against stretch options and is generally wherever the staff thinks the play will be. All that roving must leave a man dizzy.

Here's a look at the good, bad and inexplicable from Chung.

(11:52) Kendall Hunter takes an option pitch from Zac Robinson. TJ Ward strips beastly Dez Bryant and corrals but does not stop Hunter. Chung charges from the third level, delivers a hard tackle that nearly forces a fumble. Hunter stopped after a gain of five.

Quick Read: Chung is a very good downhill tackler and knows when to fight his way into the action. He relies a little too much on his pop and gets a bit messy with his wrap. Nice support tackle.

(8:46) Oklahoma State is pinned at its one. The Cowboys run a play action boot right. Chung is matched tight to Bryant, but Bradon Pettigrew slips directly underneath. Chung immediately breaks off coverage with Bryant and delivers a hard support tackle on Pettigrew. The monster tight end is stopped immediately.

Quick Read: Another nice instinct play. Chung has good cover on Bryant, but when Pettigrew receives just underneath Bryant, Chung breaks on the pass and delivers a solid tackle.

(7:26) Robinson pitches to Keith Toston. The option sucks up Oregon's defense, leaving Tolston with one to beat to the corner and to the end zone. That one is Patrick Chung. Chung flies down, but doesn't properly square, burying a shoulder in Tolston but not wrapping. The hit jars Tolston but he stays on his feet, stumbling for an additional eight.

Quick Read: Spencer Paysinger cleans up. Bit of the good, bit of the bad here. Chung gets a body on Toston and disrupts an otherwise drive ending play, but a squared hit ends the play before the first.

(7:26) Oklahoma State breaks:

Oregon plays a Cover 2 man. Chung drops into the weakside soft shell. Pettigrew perfectly negotiates the zone, finds the soft spot between middle linebacker Casey Matthews and Chung, Robinson finds him, Pettrigrew receives--

Chung lays the wood. Pettigrew holds on for 15.

Quick Read: The 263 pound Pettigrew holds on, but most pros don't. Not much can be done against a deftly carved zone, but Chung shows his cover 2 chops by immediately breaking on the pass, cutting off the route and delivering a man-stopper thump against one of the biggest, most physical and most talented tight ends in college football.

To be continued.

Josh Wilson

Overview: To read the dailies, Josh Wilson was fighting for his job last preseason. The specter of Kevin Hobbs haunted his every failure. Kevin Hobbs was adored by coaches. Kevin Hobbs was the most improved player on defense. Kevin Hobbs is six feet tall. Here's to preseason journalistic potboiler.

Wilson started the season at nickel and eventually replaced the injured and ineffective Kelly Jennings. Not the cover man Jennings was in 2007, Wilson more than made up the difference with big plays. Though picked on at times, Wilson showed a lot of promise and had what must be called a good sophomore season.

What Went Wrong: Wilson is indeed short and has problems against taller receivers. I think Wilson must learn when to drop cover and just bury the shoulder. A good tackle can be a great pass defense. He could also improve his timing on jump balls. Concerns about him biting on the double move loom, but were unwarranted in 2008. He'd occasionally bite on a break, but his recovery speed was more than adequate. He whiffs attempting to press and that skill may never develop. His overall cover skills are suspect and teams target him a lot. He fails to convert blitzes into sacks.

Quintessential Game: Seattle at New York

The Wilson train takes all passengers, but is nonstop until the end zone: One play really defines Wilson's quarter.

3^rd and 9 from the Giants 26. The play after The Good Play. New York breaks 4 WR, Rb, SG. Seattle in a 3-3 nickel. My beloved 3-3 nickel. The action is on the left. Wilson is at second corner, or left CB, opposite Domenick Hixon. Deon Grant plays opposite slot receiver Amani Toomer. At the snap, Toomer runs a wheel route. For the uninitiated, that's horizontal towards the sideline and then up field. Hixon diagonals in on what becomes a squared in. Grant and Wilson, in part because they are playing off, avoid picking each other out of the play, and each retains coverage. Kind of. Grant is nails, picking up Toomer and running step for step with him down the sideline. Wilson fails, running a looping route over Grant, over Toomer and only sorta towards Hixon. Hixon is easily open after his cut, receives and suffers a vicious hit from behind by Wilson. The quality of coverage and vague dirtiness of the tackle is Brian Russell like.

What Went Right: Wilson can play the ball while keeping coverage. His ball skills are very good. He's dangerous after the pick averaging 33.8 yards per return. He's a great open field tackler and brings the hammer forcing three fumbles in 2008. He's fast enough to recover on almost any route and has some hops to supplement his height. He's a developing blitzer and so fast off the snap that he's nearly unblockable on nickel blitzes.

Quintessential Game: Arizona at Seattle

Here's Wilson's list of non-special teams plays that accrued an official stat, and the context of that play. In parentheses is a running tally of the yards allowed that Wilson is directly responsible for.

1. First and ten, Josh Wilson's assignment, Larry Fitzgerald, receives for nine. (9)
2. Third and one, Wilson's assignment, Fitzgerald, receives for three and the first. (12)
3. Arizona attempts an end around, Anquan Boldin holds Wilson. Net lost yards: 10. (2)
4. First and ten, Wilson's assignment, Boldin, receives for nine. (11)
5. Kelly Jennings' assignment, Boldin, breaks tackles by Jennings and Brian Russell and receives for 45. Wilson tackles. (11)
6. First and ten, Wilson's assignment, Fitzgerald, receives for 33. (44)
7. First and ten, Jordan Babineaux's assignment, Boldin, receives for nine. Wilson tackles. (44)
8. Third and four, Babineaux's assignment, Steve Breaston, receives for six. Wilson tackles. (44)
9. First and ten, Wilson is assigned Jerheme Urban, picks Kurt Warner's pass, returns the ball 58 yards. (-14).
10. First and ten, Wilson's assignment, Fitzgerald, receives for eight. (-6)
11. Third and seven, Wilson's assignment, Fitzgerald, receives for 21. Wilson forces Fitzgerald to fumble. (15)
12. First and ten, Boldin is targeted on a wide receiver screen, Fitzgerald attempts to block Wilson, but Wilson squirts under and records the tackle after only 4. (15)

Outlook: Wilson turns 24 next week. Happy birthday, Pistol. Wilson will add a little muscle weight and lose a little speed, but from a tools standpoint, the next few years probably represent Wilson's peak. The most improvement will come from skills growth. That's tricky to project. Ball hawk corners can go poof in an instant. The interceptions disappear and suddenly their cover skills are exposed. It's encouraging that three of Wilson's four picks came on good coverage, because being in the right place at the right time on a tipped or errant pass is not repeatable. It's possible Wilson puts it all together, matches his already great ball skills with good cover skills, or that Wilson plays over a good enough pass rush to have some of his cover skills hidden, but I think Wilson's future is as an exceptional nickelback: Matched against lesser receivers; Playing more zone; Allowed to blitz; And not asked to play on an island against the bigger, craftier or taller receivers of the NFL. An athletic, versatile, active and sometimes game breaking nickelback is a heckuva player.

Courtney Taylor

Overview: Taylor was tapped to fill in for Deion Branch. His first game was a disaster. His second withered under stifling coverage by Nate Clements. At that point, Seattle, coaches, quarterback and fans, gave up on him. Taylor went on to play in ten games, starting four, and recorded only nine receptions.

What Went Wrong: Everything short of injury and some might say staying healthy was a mistake, too. Now, of course it's premature to write him off entirely, but Seattle has moved on and rightfully. He didn't get open or wasn't targeted, and if he just wasn't targeted, it's probably because he looked shaky and incapable when he was.

Quintessential Game: Seattle at Buffalo

Courtney Taylor dropped two passes. This first, on Seattle's first offensive play of the game, was entirely accurate. The second, on a drag that had success written all over it, was somewhat behind him, forcing Taylor to break his route an ever so tiny amount. Both should have been caught. Easily. That was bad, sloppy football by Taylor.

What Went Right:  This:

Outlook: Frustration aside, Taylor likely sticks. He was Seattle's best gunner by season's end; Perhaps the only Seahawk that could both run the field and tackle. His upside is, coincidentally, TJ Houshmandzadeh with better jump ball skills. The chance he achieves it is about equal the chance Lawrence Jackson becomes Justin Tuck, but as long as Taylor's young, athletic, can contribute on special teams and is cheap, there's no reason to drop him. Pro Football Prospectus reports that in 2008, Greg Knapp ran 4+ wide receiver sets on 4% of all plays. Taylor won't develop much while Seattle's wide receiver corps is healthy. So he'll have plenty of opportunities. If nothing else he can spell Nate Burleson. As the last man who still believes in him, I wish Taylor a healthy preseason. He needs one.

Colin Cole saw nine snaps in the second half. It was more of the same. Cole was competent against single blocks and completely overmatched against double blocks. On this play

1-10-GB 48 (9:58) 33-M.Turner right tackle to GB 39 for 9 yards (74-A.Kampman, 79-R.Pickett).

Cole was pushed three yards off the line.

And that's a conservative estimate.

Cole is competent against single blocks, but he is by no means effective. Cole may tussle with the blocker, get under his pads, contort him right and left and eventually shed the blocker, but he has no follow up. He's far too slow to rush the passer (and getting slower). He'll rarely shed fast enough to redirect a run. And he doesn't make a ton of productive tackles himself. Of his 126 career tackles, just ten are for a loss. Brandon Mebane has nine in 68 tackles. Rocky Bernard has 44 in 281.

Cole wasn't signed to dance with single blockers. He was signed to stand up to the double team and keep blockers out of the second level. I see no evidence that he will. The best Seattle can hope for is that Mebane becomes such a beast at the three that teams must regularly double him. In this scenario, Mebane keeps Cole looking good, Cole shows something facing single blocks he's never shown facing double blocks, Tim Ruskell looks smart and Cole looks the late bloomer. It's possible.

I have serious doubts. Mebane made a great one tech. For him to be a great three tech, he's going to need someone to keep blockers off him. Because if he's regularly doubled at three, and that's a rare phenomenon, even then talent is squandered. A beastly Mebane deserves a partner that can keep the heat off him. A Pat Williams to his Kevin Williams. I see no reason to think that's Cole, and I see no reason to think this signing was anything but a mistake. Teams will run at Cole and Mebane can't stop that. Making Cole either liability or handicap. Without seeing him take a single snap in Blue, I'd accept dead money to shed this dead weight.